From 8b4da3dc0516fe9415ddfa6d6190d3b71ad3dac8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nixevol <guaotiantang@outlook.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 10:43:13 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?fix:=20=E7=AE=A1=E7=90=86=E5=91=98=20IP=20?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=E9=94=81=E5=AE=9A=E4=B8=8D=E5=86=8D=E9=98=BB=E6=96=AD=E5=B7=B2?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=E8=AE=A4=E8=AF=81=20Cookie=20=E4=B8=8E=20API=20=E4=BB=A4?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=E7=89=8C?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

---
 docs/DEVIATIONS.md           |  9 +++++
 internal/admin/admin_test.go | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 internal/admin/auth.go       |  8 +---
 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs/DEVIATIONS.md b/docs/DEVIATIONS.md
index 3ebcd47..d0ea67b 100644
--- a/docs/DEVIATIONS.md
+++ b/docs/DEVIATIONS.md
@@ -1092,3 +1092,12 @@
    - 原因：同一连接上 `group.create`/`group.add` 同步向本连接注入下行时，与 mochi InlineClient 互相等待，`resp` 回不去（`TestUplinkDMOfflineGroupRecall` 在清掉测试客户端 dial deadline 后稳定复现）。  
    - 备选方案：broker 层对 Inline 发布做无锁队列。  
    - 影响：`group_event` 可能略晚于 `resp` 到达；业务结果仍以 `resp` 为准。
+
+### fix-issue-1
+
+1. **管理员 IP 锁定不再阻断已认证会话**  
+   - 原条款：PRD D18 / F02（密码锁只拦密码登录，不拦已有会话令牌）；DEVELOPMENT 第 5/8 节（管理员登录锁定、错误令牌按 IP 计入锁定）；issue #1。  
+   - 实际做法：去掉 `internal/admin/auth.go` 的 `auth()` 鉴权前 `Check(LockAdminIP)`；登录入口仍 `Check`/`Fail`，错误或停用 API 令牌仍经 `authFail` 计入锁定。有效 Cookie 与合法 Bearer 在锁定期可继续调管理接口。  
+   - 原因：先前把「防暴力登录」扩成「封整个管理面」，同 NAT 下刷错误 Bearer 即可锁死已登录管理员，与端侧 nst_ 重连语义不一致。  
+   - 备选方案：锁定期对 Cookie 与令牌也拒绝（否决，违背 D18 对齐）。  
+   - 影响：仅管理后台鉴权中间件；端侧登录锁定未改。
diff --git a/internal/admin/admin_test.go b/internal/admin/admin_test.go
index d999114..9df00ed 100644
--- a/internal/admin/admin_test.go
+++ b/internal/admin/admin_test.go
@@ -280,6 +280,82 @@ func TestLoginLock(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestAdminLockDoesNotBlockAuthedSession：密码失败触发 IP 锁后，
+// 已有 Cookie 会话与合法 API 令牌仍可调管理接口；未认证密码登录仍被拒。
+func TestAdminLockDoesNotBlockAuthedSession(t *testing.T) {
+	_, srv, cookieClient, _ := setup(t)
+	base := srv.URL
+
+	login(t, cookieClient, base)
+
+	res := postJSON(t, cookieClient, base+"/api/admin/tokens",
+		`{"name":"ops-lock"}`,
+		map[string]string{"X-Nixmsg-Request": "1"})
+	env := decodeEnv(t, res)
+	if res.StatusCode != 200 || !env.OK {
+		t.Fatalf("create token: %d %+v", res.StatusCode, env)
+	}
+	var created struct {
+		Token string `json:"token"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(env.Data, &created); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+		bad := &http.Client{}
+		res := postJSON(t, bad, base+"/api/admin/login",
+			`{"username":"admin","password":"wrong-password!!"}`, nil)
+		env := decodeEnv(t, res)
+		if i < 9 {
+			if res.StatusCode != 401 {
+				t.Fatalf("fail %d: want 401 got %d %+v", i, res.StatusCode, env)
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		if res.StatusCode != 429 || env.Error == nil || env.Error.Code != "rate_limited" {
+			t.Fatalf("10th fail want 429 rate_limited got %d %+v", res.StatusCode, env)
+		}
+	}
+
+	res = doReq(t, cookieClient, http.MethodGet, base+"/api/admin/me", "", nil)
+	env = decodeEnv(t, res)
+	if res.StatusCode != 200 || !env.OK {
+		t.Fatalf("cookie me after lock: want 200 got %d %+v", res.StatusCode, env)
+	}
+	var me map[string]any
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(env.Data, &me)
+	if me["auth"] != "cookie" {
+		t.Fatalf("cookie me auth=%v", me["auth"])
+	}
+
+	tokClient := &http.Client{}
+	hdr := map[string]string{"Authorization": "Bearer " + created.Token}
+	res = doReq(t, tokClient, http.MethodGet, base+"/api/admin/me", "", hdr)
+	env = decodeEnv(t, res)
+	if res.StatusCode != 200 || !env.OK {
+		t.Fatalf("token me after lock: want 200 got %d %+v", res.StatusCode, env)
+	}
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(env.Data, &me)
+	if me["auth"] != "token" {
+		t.Fatalf("token me auth=%v", me["auth"])
+	}
+
+	res = doReq(t, tokClient, http.MethodGet, base+"/api/admin/overview", "", hdr)
+	env = decodeEnv(t, res)
+	if res.StatusCode != 200 || !env.OK {
+		t.Fatalf("token overview after lock: want 200 got %d %+v", res.StatusCode, env)
+	}
+
+	anon := &http.Client{}
+	res = postJSON(t, anon, base+"/api/admin/login",
+		`{"username":"admin","password":"`+testPassword+`"}`, nil)
+	env = decodeEnv(t, res)
+	if res.StatusCode != 429 || env.Error == nil || env.Error.Code != "rate_limited" {
+		t.Fatalf("password login while locked want 429 got %d %+v", res.StatusCode, env)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestBadAPITokenCountsTowardLock(t *testing.T) {
 	_, srv, _, _ := setup(t)
 	base := srv.URL
diff --git a/internal/admin/auth.go b/internal/admin/auth.go
index c6e2e56..37c7c5b 100644
--- a/internal/admin/auth.go
+++ b/internal/admin/auth.go
@@ -43,12 +43,8 @@ func (h *Handler) auth(next http.HandlerFunc) http.Handler {
 	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		ip := httpx.ClientIP(r, h.trusted)
 
-		if locked, retry := h.locks.Check(auth.LockKey{Kind: auth.LockAdminIP, IP: ip}); locked {
-			w.Header().Set("Retry-After", formatRetryAfter(retry))
-			httpx.WriteError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "rate_limited", "登录已锁定，请稍后再试")
-			return
-		}
-
+		// 锁定只拦密码登录（login.go）与错误令牌试错累计；
+		// 已认证的 Cookie / 合法 API 令牌在锁定期仍可用（对齐 PRD D18）。
 		p, errCode, errMsg, status := h.authenticate(r, ip)
 		if status != 0 {
 			if status == http.StatusTooManyRequests {